Operations Reference

This page lists all available Operations API operations, grouped by category. Each entry links to the feature section where the full documentation lives.

For endpoint and authentication setup, see the Operations API Overview.

---

Databases & Tables

Operations for managing databases, tables, and attributes.

Detailed documentation: Database Overview

Operation	Description	Role Required
describe_all	Returns definitions of all databases and tables, with record counts	any
describe_database	Returns all table definitions for a specified database	any
describe_table	Returns the definition of a specified table	any
create_database	Creates a new database	super_user
drop_database	Drops a database and all its tables/records	super_user
create_table	Creates a new table with optional schema and expiration	super_user
drop_table	Drops a table and all its records	super_user
create_attribute	Adds a new attribute to a table	super_user
drop_attribute	Removes an attribute and all its values from a table	super_user

describe_all

Returns the definitions of all databases and tables within the database. Record counts above 5000 records are estimated; the response includes estimated_record_range when estimated. To force an exact count (requires full table scan), include "exact_count": true. Each table definition includes the record-structure dictionary fields described for describe_table.

{ "operation": "describe_all" }

describe_database

Returns all table definitions within the specified database. Each table definition includes the record-structure dictionary fields described for describe_table.

{ "operation": "describe_database", "database": "dev" }

describe_table

Returns the definition of a specific table.

{ "operation": "describe_table", "table": "dog", "database": "dev" }

Changed in: v5.2.5

Alongside the schema, the response carries the size of the table's record-structure dictionaries — the physical record layouts Harper has seen for this table. They are how you check whether a table is getting random-access field encoding and how much room it has left before novel layouts stop receiving it:

Field	Description
typed_structures_enabled	Whether random-access (typed) encoding is enabled for this table
typed_structure_count	Structures in the random-access dictionary
typed_structure_limit	Bound past which novel record shapes are stored without random-access field encoding
classic_structure_count	Structures in the classic named-record dictionary

A typed structure is minted per distinct shape, where shape means the ordered list of fields plus the encoded type and width each field's value takes — so {a, b} and {b, a} are different shapes, and so are {v: 1}, {v: 70000}, and {v: "ok"}. Dictionary size therefore tracks the variety of shapes a table has ever written, not its column count, and it only grows: structures are never pruned, because stored records, transaction-log entries, and replication backlogs all reference them by id. A classic structure keys on the ordered field names alone, so classic_structure_count moves only when a table writes a field-name set it has not written before, and it stops at 32 — the classic dictionary's own bound, which is why the response carries no limit field for it.

storage.randomAccessFields defaults to off, so typed_structures_enabled: false with typed_structure_count: 0 is the normal state for most tables — that is typed encoding being disabled, not spare headroom. Where it is enabled, reaching typed_structure_limit is not an error: records with novel shapes past that point still write and read correctly, but are stored without random-access field encoding, which makes reading individual fields of large records slower. Harper logs a warning when a thread first observes the bound, but that depends on which thread served the writes and whether it has loaded the dictionary — the counts here are the reliable signal.

To keep the typed dictionary small, write records in a consistent field order, avoid making the set of present fields vary per write (nest volatile or optional fields inside one sub-object rather than adding and removing top-level fields), keep a given field to one value type across records, and expect a small fixed number of extra shapes from numeric fields whose values cross a width boundary.

create_database

Creates a new database.

{ "operation": "create_database", "database": "dev" }

drop_database

Drops a database and all its tables/records. Supports "replicated": true to propagate to all cluster nodes.

{ "operation": "drop_database", "database": "dev" }

create_table

Creates a new table. Optional fields: database (defaults to data), attributes (array defining schema), expiration (TTL in seconds).

{
	"operation": "create_table",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"primary_key": "id"
}

drop_table

Drops a table and all associated records. Supports "replicated": true.

{ "operation": "drop_table", "database": "dev", "table": "dog" }

create_attribute

Creates a new attribute within a table. Harper auto-creates attributes on insert/update, but this can be used to pre-define them (e.g., for role-based permission setup).

{
	"operation": "create_attribute",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"attribute": "is_adorable"
}

drop_attribute

Drops an attribute and all its values from the specified table.

{
	"operation": "drop_attribute",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"attribute": "is_adorable"
}

---

NoSQL Operations

Operations for inserting, updating, deleting, and querying records using NoSQL.

Detailed documentation: REST Querying Reference

Operation	Description	Role Required
insert	Inserts one or more records	any
update	Updates one or more records by primary key	any
upsert	Inserts or updates records	any
delete	Deletes records by primary key	any
search_by_id	Retrieves records by primary key	any
search_by_value	Retrieves records matching a value on any attribute	any
search_by_conditions	Retrieves records matching complex conditions with sorting and pagination	any

insert

Inserts one or more records. If a primary key is not provided, a GUID or auto-increment value is generated.

{
	"operation": "insert",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"records": [{ "id": 1, "dog_name": "Penny" }]
}

update

Updates one or more records. Primary key must be supplied for each record.

{
	"operation": "update",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"records": [{ "id": 1, "weight_lbs": 38 }]
}

upsert

Updates existing records and inserts new ones. Matches on primary key if provided.

{
	"operation": "upsert",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"records": [{ "id": 1, "weight_lbs": 40 }]
}

delete

Deletes records by primary key values.

{
	"operation": "delete",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"ids": [1, 2]
}

search_by_id

Returns records matching the given primary key values. Use "get_attributes": ["*"] to return all attributes.

{
	"operation": "search_by_id",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"ids": [1, 2],
	"get_attributes": ["dog_name", "breed_id"]
}

search_by_value

Returns records with a matching value on any attribute. Supports wildcards (e.g., "Ky*").

{
	"operation": "search_by_value",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"attribute": "owner_name",
	"value": "Ky*",
	"get_attributes": ["id", "dog_name"]
}

search_by_conditions

Returns records matching one or more conditions. Supports operator (and/or), offset, limit, nested conditions groups, and sort with multi-level tie-breaking.

{
	"operation": "search_by_conditions",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"operator": "and",
	"limit": 10,
	"get_attributes": ["*"],
	"conditions": [{ "attribute": "age", "comparator": "between", "value": [5, 8] }]
}

---

Bulk Operations

Operations for bulk import/export of data.

Detailed documentation: Database Jobs

Operation	Description	Role Required
export_local	Exports query results to a local file in JSON or CSV	super_user
csv_data_load	Ingests CSV data provided inline	any
csv_file_load	Ingests CSV data from a server-local file path	any
csv_url_load	Ingests CSV data from a URL	any
export_to_s3	Exports query results to AWS S3	super_user
import_from_s3	Imports CSV or JSON data from AWS S3	any
delete_records_before	Deletes records older than a given timestamp (local node only)	super_user

All bulk import/export operations are asynchronous and return a job ID. Use get_job to check status.

export_local

Exports query results to a local path on the server. Formats: json or csv.

{
	"operation": "export_local",
	"format": "json",
	"path": "/data/",
	"search_operation": { "operation": "sql", "sql": "SELECT * FROM dev.dog" }
}

csv_data_load

Ingests inline CSV data. Actions: insert (default), update, upsert.

{
	"operation": "csv_data_load",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"action": "insert",
	"data": "id,name\n1,Penny\n"
}

csv_file_load

Ingests CSV from a file path on the server running Harper.

{
	"operation": "csv_file_load",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"file_path": "/home/user/imports/dogs.csv"
}

csv_url_load

Ingests CSV from a URL.

{
	"operation": "csv_url_load",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"csv_url": "https://example.com/dogs.csv"
}

export_to_s3

Exports query results to an AWS S3 bucket as JSON or CSV.

{
	"operation": "export_to_s3",
	"format": "json",
	"s3": {
		"aws_access_key_id": "YOUR_KEY",
		"aws_secret_access_key": "YOUR_SECRET",
		"bucket": "my-bucket",
		"key": "dogs.json",
		"region": "us-east-1"
	},
	"search_operation": { "operation": "sql", "sql": "SELECT * FROM dev.dog" }
}

import_from_s3

Imports CSV or JSON from an AWS S3 bucket. File must include a valid .csv or .json extension.

{
	"operation": "import_from_s3",
	"database": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"s3": {
		"aws_access_key_id": "YOUR_KEY",
		"aws_secret_access_key": "YOUR_SECRET",
		"bucket": "my-bucket",
		"key": "dogs.csv",
		"region": "us-east-1"
	}
}

delete_records_before

Deletes records older than the specified timestamp from the local node only. Clustered nodes retain their data.

{
	"operation": "delete_records_before",
	"date": "2021-01-25T23:05:27.464",
	"schema": "dev",
	"table": "dog"
}

---

SQL Operations

Operations for executing SQL statements.

warning

Harper SQL is intended for data investigation and use cases where performance is not a priority. For production workloads, use NoSQL or REST operations. SQL performance optimizations are on the roadmap.

Detailed documentation: SQL Reference

Operation	Description	Role Required
sql	Executes a SQL SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, or DELETE statement	any

sql

Executes a standard SQL statement.

{ "operation": "sql", "sql": "SELECT * FROM dev.dog WHERE id = 1" }

---

Users & Roles

Operations for managing users and role-based access control (RBAC).

Detailed documentation: Users & Roles Operations

Operation	Description	Role Required
list_roles	Returns all roles	super_user
add_role	Creates a new role with permissions	super_user
alter_role	Modifies an existing role's permissions	super_user
drop_role	Deletes a role (role must have no associated users)	super_user
list_users	Returns all users	super_user
user_info	Returns data for the authenticated user	any
add_user	Creates a new user	super_user
alter_user	Modifies an existing user's credentials or role	super_user
drop_user	Deletes a user	super_user

list_roles

Returns all roles defined in the instance.

{ "operation": "list_roles" }

add_role

Creates a new role with the specified permissions. The permission object maps database names to table-level access rules (read, insert, update, delete). Set super_user: true to grant full access.

{
	"operation": "add_role",
	"role": "developer",
	"permission": {
		"super_user": false,
		"dev": {
			"tables": {
				"dog": { "read": true, "insert": true, "update": true, "delete": false }
			}
		}
	}
}

alter_role

Modifies an existing role's name or permissions. Requires the role's id (returned by list_roles).

{
	"operation": "alter_role",
	"id": "f92162e2-cd17-450c-aae0-372a76859038",
	"role": "senior_developer",
	"permission": {
		"super_user": false,
		"dev": {
			"tables": {
				"dog": { "read": true, "insert": true, "update": true, "delete": true }
			}
		}
	}
}

drop_role

Deletes a role. The role must have no associated users before it can be dropped.

{ "operation": "drop_role", "id": "f92162e2-cd17-450c-aae0-372a76859038" }

list_users

Returns all users.

{ "operation": "list_users" }

user_info

Returns data for the currently authenticated user.

{ "operation": "user_info" }

add_user

Creates a new user. username cannot be changed after creation. password is stored encrypted.

{
	"operation": "add_user",
	"role": "developer",
	"username": "hdb_user",
	"password": "password",
	"active": true
}

alter_user

Modifies an existing user's password, role, or active status. All fields except username are optional.

{
	"operation": "alter_user",
	"username": "hdb_user",
	"password": "new_password",
	"role": "senior_developer",
	"active": true
}

drop_user

Deletes a user by username.

{ "operation": "drop_user", "username": "hdb_user" }

See Users & Roles Operations for full documentation including permission object structure.

---

Token Authentication

Operations for JWT token creation and refresh.

Detailed documentation: JWT Authentication

Operation	Description	Role Required
create_authentication_tokens	Creates an operation token and refresh token for a user	none (unauthenticated)
refresh_operation_token	Creates a new operation token from a refresh token	any
exchange_oidc_token	Trades a CI workload identity token for an operation token	none (unauthenticated)
add_oidc_trust	Creates or replaces an OIDC trust policy	super_user
list_oidc_trust	Lists all OIDC trust policies, including disabled ones	super_user
drop_oidc_trust	Deletes an OIDC trust policy	super_user

create_authentication_tokens

Does not require prior authentication when called with username/password. Returns operation_token (short-lived JWT) and refresh_token (long-lived JWT).

{
	"operation": "create_authentication_tokens",
	"username": "my-user",
	"password": "my-password"
}

With role as an inline role object, instead mints a single scoped token whose bearer is limited to the embedded permissions — requires an authenticated super_user caller; username is attribution only and must not name an existing user (defaults to scoped:<minter>); no refresh token is issued and the token cannot be revoked before expiry. See JWT Authentication / Scoped Tokens.

{
	"operation": "create_authentication_tokens",
	"username": "reporting-service",
	"role": { "permission": { "operations": ["read_only"] } },
	"expires_in": "7d"
}

refresh_operation_token

Creates a new operation token from an existing refresh token.

{
	"operation": "refresh_operation_token",
	"refresh_token": "EXISTING_REFRESH_TOKEN"
}

OIDC Trusted Publishing

Added in: v5.3.0

A CI runner can authenticate to Harper with no stored credential. It presents an identity token minted by its own provider; if that token verifies against a stored trust policy, Harper returns a one-hour operation token for the user the policy names. This is the same exchange npm, PyPI, and AWS STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity use.

The alternative is a HARPER_CLI_REFRESH_TOKEN secret: a 30-day credential, one per user, that expires on a schedule nobody tracks. A trust policy replaces it with a rule you configure once, and revoke with drop_oidc_trust.

permissions:
  id-token: write
  contents: read
environment: production
steps:
  - run: harper deploy by_ref=true
    env:
      HARPER_CLI_TARGET: ${{ vars.HARPER_CLI_TARGET }} # a var, not a secret

No secret at all — HARPER_CLI_TARGET is not sensitive. See CLI Authentication for the client half and where the exchange sits in credential precedence.

Policies live in the replicated system.hdb_oidc_trust table, so configuring one on any node applies cluster-wide.

add_oidc_trust

Creates or replaces a trust policy. super_user only — a policy lets an external system authenticate as a Harper user, so granting one is equivalent to handing out a credential.

{
	"operation": "add_oidc_trust",
	"id": "my-app-prod",
	"issuer": "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com",
	"audience": "https://my-instance.harperdb.io:9925/",
	"user": "ci-deploy",
	"claims": {
		"repository_id": "67890",
		"workflow_ref": "HarperFast/my-app/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@refs/heads/main",
		"environment": "production"
	}
}

Parameter	Description
id	Required. Policy identifier, 1–128 characters of letters, numbers, _, -, and ..
issuer	Required. The token issuer (iss) this policy trusts.
audience	Required. The audience the token must be addressed to. Should identify this instance; enforced for GitHub Actions.
claims	Required. The claim constraints a token must satisfy. At least one, and specific enough for the issuer's profile.
user	Required. The Harper user a matching run authenticates as. Must already exist and be active.
operations	Narrow the minted token to these operations, 1–100 unique names. Omit for the user's full role — see below.
enabled	Defaults to true. A disabled policy is kept but never matched.
description	Optional free text, up to 1024 characters.

Setting a policy up from the CLI

Every Operations API operation is available as a CLI command of the same name, which is usually the easiest way to configure a policy: log in once from your machine, then run the operation against the cluster.

# 1. Authenticate to the cluster you are configuring (once, interactively)
harper login https://my-instance.harperdb.io:9925

# 2. Create the trust policy
harper add_oidc_trust \
  id=my-app-prod \
  issuer=https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  audience=https://my-instance.harperdb.io:9925/ \
  user=ci-deploy \
  claims='{"repository_id":"67890","workflow_ref":"HarperFast/my-app/.github/workflows/deploy.yml@refs/heads/main","environment":"production"}'

# 3. Confirm what the cluster now trusts
harper list_oidc_trust

claims is a JSON object, so quote it as a single shell argument — the CLI parses each value as JSON, which is what turns that string into the nested object the operation expects. operations works the same way if you scope the policy: operations='["deploy_component","get_deployment"]'.

harper login stores a token for that target, so step 2 needs no credentials of its own. If you would rather not store one, pass the target and credentials explicitly instead:

harper add_oidc_trust target=https://my-instance.harperdb.io:9925 auth_username=HDB_ADMIN auth_password="$ADMIN_PASSWORD" id=my-app-prod ...

Both routes need super_user, since that is what the trust-policy operations require.

This replaces the policy rather than merging into it. A partial update is how an over-broad policy gets created by accident, and the point of claims is that every constraint in it was written deliberately.

Narrowing what the token may do (operations)

The user the policy names is the privilege boundary: a matching run gets that user's role. operations narrows it further, so one CI user can back several policies that each do less than the role allows:

{
	"operation": "add_oidc_trust",
	"id": "my-app-prod",
	"issuer": "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com",
	"audience": "https://my-instance.harperdb.io:9925/",
	"user": "ci-deploy",
	"operations": ["deploy_component", "get_deployment", "restart_service"],
	"claims": { "repository_id": "67890", "environment": "production" }
}

It is narrowing only — never widening. An operation the role forbids stays forbidden, so the scope cannot be used to grant something the user does not already have. Omit operations and the token carries the user's full role.

Names are validated when the policy is written, against the same registry add_role and alter_role use, so a typo is rejected there rather than failing later inside CI with nothing to point at. One consequence: an operation a component registered at runtime with server.registerOperation is not recognized, because that registry is process-local, so a policy naming one is rejected. It fails closed — a rejected policy, never a widened one — and the same gap applies to add_role and alter_role.

warning

The scope covers the Operations API and SQL, not the application data path. It is enforced at the verifyPerms / verifyPermsAST gate, so a scoped token still carries the role's full table-level CRUD when it reaches an application's REST or GraphQL resources, which authorize through checkPermission instead.

So operations bounds what a CI credential can administer, not what data it can read or write. If that matters, point the policy's user at a role that is itself least-privilege for the data the token can reach, rather than relying on the scope alone.

A scoped token also cannot trade itself for a browser session: create_authentication_tokens with purpose: "login" is refused, because a session carries no operation scope and would silently restore the user's full role.

user is resolved at write time. A policy naming a user that does not exist, or one that is inactive, is rejected — otherwise it would fail only at exchange time, inside CI, with nothing to point at. If the named user is a super_user, the policy is still created but the response carries a warning: any run matching it gains full administrative access.

Claim constraints are exact string matches. A value may be a string, or an array of strings meaning any-of:

{ "claims": { "repository": "HarperFast/my-app", "ref": ["refs/heads/main", "refs/heads/release"] } }

A constrained claim that is absent from the token fails rather than passes, so a policy cannot be weakened by an issuer that stops emitting a claim.

The audience should identify this instance. For GitHub Actions, Harper rejects the provider's shared default — anything shaped like https://github.com/<owner> — because that value is shared by every repository under the owner, so accepting it would make a token minted by any of them valid here.

That check is a guard against the one known-dangerous value, not a proof of correctness: Harper does not compare the audience against its own identity, so an arbitrary or mistyped value is accepted at write time and instead fails to match at exchange time, when the CLI derives the audience from its target URL. Use the instance URL your CI targets. For an issuer with no registered profile the audience is not checked for specificity at all, and the required sub pin is what binds the policy to one principal.

Policy specificity for GitHub Actions

For https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com, a policy must satisfy all three of these, each closing a distinct way a policy can be accidentally broad:

Requirement	Satisfied by one of	Left open otherwise
Pin the repository	repository_id, repository	Any repository
Pin the workflow	workflow_ref, workflow_path, job_workflow_ref, job_workflow_path	Any workflow in that repository
Gate the ref	workflow_ref, ref, environment	Any branch that can be pushed to the repository

The ref gate is the one worth understanding, and it is stricter than npm's model. Pinning repository and workflow without also pinning a ref is not safe: anyone who can push a branch can add the trusted workflow to that branch and mint a token. npm accepts that shape and relies on environment protection instead.

Consequences worth planning around:

• repository_id is preferred over repository because it is immutable — it survives a repository rename, and is immune to org-name recycling.
• A tag-triggered release cannot pin workflow_ref, since the tag is unknown when the policy is written. Pin workflow_path instead — Harper derives it from workflow_ref by removing the ref — and gate on environment.
• ref_type: tag is deliberately not accepted as a ref gate. Anyone with push access can create a tag.
• sub is not accepted as a pin. It varies by trigger, and its format changed for repositories created after 2026-07-15 (immutable subjects embed owner and repository ids), so a policy pinning it would have to handle two shapes indefinitely.
• job_workflow_ref pins the workflow but does not gate the ref. In a reusable workflow, it names the reusable workflow that ran, not the caller that invoked it, and its @ref suffix is that workflow's own branch — constant however it is called. Accepting it as a ref gate would admit any branch of any repository that references the reusable workflow. Pin the workflow with it if you like, then gate the ref with workflow_ref, ref, or environment.
• pull_request_target runs are denied unless the policy explicitly constrains event_name. Such a run executes the base repository's workflow, with its secrets, while a fork controls the checked-out code. A plain pull_request run from a fork cannot mint at all, since it gets no id-token: write.

Other issuers

An issuer with no registered profile gets a strict generic profile: the policy must pin sub. That is the one claim every OIDC issuer defines as identifying a single principal, and it makes workload identity work with no provider-specific code — a Kubernetes service-account token (system:serviceaccount:<namespace>:<name>), a GCP service account, and a SPIFFE SVID all carry a stable canonical subject.

GitHub Actions needs its own profile precisely because its sub is the one claim you should not pin.

exchange_oidc_token

Trades an identity token for a Harper operation token. Unauthenticated by design — this operation is the authentication, the way create_authentication_tokens is against a password. The CLI calls it for you; you would call it directly only from a client that mints its own requests.

{
	"operation": "exchange_oidc_token",
	"token": "eyJhbGciOi..."
}

Response:

{
	"operation_token": "eyJhbGciOi...",
	"expires_in": 3600,
	"username": "ci-deploy",
	"policy": "my-app-prod"
}

The operation token is valid for one hour — long enough to cover a slow deploy, short enough to bound the exposure if it leaks. That is a reduced window, not safety: within the hour it is a live credential carrying the policy's identity, so treat it like any other secret and keep it out of logs and step outputs. No refresh token is issued; a subsequent run performs a new exchange.

note

Every rejection of a well-formed token returns the same message. The endpoint is unauthenticated, so a caller told which check failed could enumerate a policy one claim at a time. A malformed request — a missing token, or one over 8192 characters — is rejected by schema validation before any of that, with its own message; that reveals nothing about a policy. The specific reason is written to the oidc-trust logger, which is where to look when a workflow that should match does not.

An identity token can be exchanged once. Harper records a SHA-256 fingerprint of each spent token in system.hdb_oidc_token_use, expiring with the token itself, so the table stays proportional to in-flight tokens and never holds a credential. The record is written before the operation token is minted: if minting then fails, the identity token is burned, costing a CI re-run, where the reverse order would leave a spendable token behind.

That replay check is replicated, but replication is asynchronous, so two simultaneous replays against different nodes can both succeed. This is not a privilege escalation — whoever holds the token could obtain one operation token regardless — and what it does stop is the realistic case: a token that leaks after a legitimate run and is reused inside its window.

Exchanges are recorded in the authentication audit stream alongside Basic, Bearer, and mTLS events, for failures as well as successes — a run repeatedly failing to authenticate is what an audit trail is for. Enable it with logging.auditAuthEvents.logSuccessful and logging.auditAuthEvents.logFailed.

list_oidc_trust

Lists every policy, including disabled ones, sorted by id. super_user only — the policy set names exactly which repository and workflow are worth compromising.

{ "operation": "list_oidc_trust" }

Returns { "policies": [ ... ] }. Each entry carries id, issuer, audience, claims, user, operations (null when unscoped), enabled, description, updated_by, and timestamps.

drop_oidc_trust

Stops every workflow that matched the policy from exchanging again. super_user only. Fails with 404 if no policy has that id.

{ "operation": "drop_oidc_trust", "id": "my-app-prod" }

caution

This does not revoke operation tokens already issued. The minted token is a stateless JWT valid until its one-hour expiry, so a token obtained moments before the policy was dropped keeps authorizing for the rest of that hour.

Dropping the policy is therefore containment against future runs. If you are responding to a suspected compromise rather than doing routine cleanup, also deactivate or re-role the user the policy named (alter_user), which is what stops a token that is already in someone's hands.

---

Components

Operations for deploying and managing Harper components (applications, plugins).

Detailed documentation: Components Overview

Operation	Description	Role Required
add_component	Creates a new component project from a template	super_user
deploy_component	Deploys a component via payload (tar) or package reference (NPM/GitHub)	super_user
package_component	Packages a component project into a base64-encoded tar	super_user
drop_component	Deletes a component or a file within a component	super_user
get_components	Lists all component files and config	super_user
get_component_file	Returns the contents of a file within a component	super_user
set_component_file	Creates or updates a file within a component	super_user
list_deployments	Lists deployment records with optional filters	super_user
get_deployment	Fetches a single deployment record by ID; supports SSE streaming	super_user
get_deployment_payload	Returns the tarball stored for a deployment	super_user
delete_deployment_payload	Removes the stored tarball to free space	super_user
add_ssh_key	Adds an SSH key for deploying from private repositories	super_user
update_ssh_key	Updates an existing SSH key	super_user
delete_ssh_key	Deletes an SSH key	super_user
list_ssh_keys	Lists all configured SSH key names	super_user
set_ssh_known_hosts	Overwrites the SSH known_hosts file	super_user
get_ssh_known_hosts	Returns the contents of the SSH known_hosts file	super_user
install_node_modules	(Deprecated) Run npm install on component projects	super_user

deploy_component

Deploys a component. The package option accepts any valid NPM reference including GitHub repos (HarperDB/app#semver:v1.0.0), tarballs, or NPM packages. The payload option accepts a base64-encoded tar string from package_component. Supports "replicated": true and "restart": true or "restart": "rolling".

Additional parameters:

• urlPath — the HTTP URL path the component is mounted at (e.g. "/api/v2"). Must not contain .. or . path segments. Persisted on the component's root-config entry; see HTTP middleware routing.
• host Added in: v5.2.0 — the virtual hostname the component is served on (e.g. "api.example.com"). Must be a bare hostname or IPv6 literal — no scheme, port, path, or brackets. Persisted alongside urlPath.
• install_allow_scripts — set to true to allow npm pre/post install scripts (disabled by default)
• credentials — credentials for installing a component from a private npm registry or private git repository (see below)

urlPath and host both require package and are rejected on a payload-only deploy. To mount a payload-deployed component, add host/urlPath to its entry in the root harper-config.yaml instead.

Deploy credentials (credentials)

When a component is installed from a private source, credentials supplies the authentication. It is an array of entries; each entry is one of two kinds, identified by its key:

• npm registry auth — an entry with a registry key, applied to a private npm registry.
• git host auth — an entry with a host key, applied to a private git repository fetched by reference (e.g. package: "github:my-org/my-app#semver:v1.2.3").

An entry provides its credential exactly one of two ways — a literal token, or a secret reference:

Field	Kind	Description
registry	npm	The registry URL or host the credential applies to. Required for an npm entry.
scope	npm	Optional npm @scope (e.g. "@my-org") the entry applies to; omit to set the default registry.
host	git	The bare git host the credential applies to (e.g. "github.com"). Required for a git entry.
username	git	Optional git HTTPS username. Defaults to x-access-token (GitHub); GitLab uses oauth2, Bitbucket x-token-auth.
token	both	A literal auth token, or
secret	both	The name of an hdb_secret row to resolve the token from.

A provided token is not treated as ephemeral: Harper ingests it into the encrypted secrets store and references it everywhere, so package-reference deploys keep working through rollback, reboot, and new peers joining — without re-supplying the token. The token is encrypted at rest, stripped from the operation before replication and from the operations log, and only ever crosses the cluster as ciphertext. A git-host token is additionally served to git from memory (via a credential helper) — it is never written to a file or into a URL. Using a secret reference names an existing store row directly. Ingesting a token requires custody on the deploying node; on OSS core without custody, a literal token falls back to a transient, this-node-only credential (not persisted or replicated).

Ingested tokens are stored under a derived name granted to the component — deploy.<component>.<registry> for a registry entry, deploy.<component>.git.<host> for a git entry — so re-deploying with a rotated token idempotently updates the same row.

Private npm registry:

{
	"operation": "deploy_component",
	"project": "my-app",
	"package": "npm:@my-org/my-app@1.2.3",
	"credentials": [{ "registry": "https://registry.my-org.com", "scope": "@my-org", "token": "npm_..." }]
}

Private git repository (token resolved from an existing secret):

{
	"operation": "deploy_component",
	"project": "my-app",
	"package": "github:my-org/my-app#semver:v1.2.3",
	"credentials": [{ "host": "github.com", "secret": "deploy.my-app.git.github_com" }]
}

note

credentials replaces the earlier registryAuth field (renamed while the feature was in alpha, before it grew to carry git-host credentials). registryAuth is now rejected with an error directing you to credentials.

The response includes a deployment_id that can be used to query the deployment record:

{
	"operation": "deploy_component",
	"project": "my-app",
	"package": "my-org/my-app#semver:v1.2.3",
	"replicated": true,
	"restart": "rolling"
}

Response:

{
	"deployment_id": "a3f8c2d1...",
	"message": "Component deployed successfully"
}

Deployment Operations

Harper records every deploy_component call in the system.hdb_deployment table, capturing the full lifecycle of a deployment including phase transitions (prepare → load → replicate → restart → success/failed), per-node outcomes, and a bounded event log of install output.

list_deployments

Returns a list of deployment records, newest first. All filter parameters are optional.

Parameter	Type	Description
project	string	Filter to a specific component project
status	string	Filter by status: pending, success, failed
since	number	Start of time range (Unix timestamp ms)
until	number	End of time range (Unix timestamp ms)
limit	number	Maximum number of results (default: 100)
offset	number	Pagination offset

{
	"operation": "list_deployments",
	"project": "my-app",
	"status": "success",
	"limit": 20
}

Response includes a deployments array and a total count. The payload_blob field is stripped from list responses for size; use get_deployment_payload to retrieve the tarball.

get_deployment

Returns a single deployment record by deployment_id. When called on an in-progress deployment via a request that accepts text/event-stream, the response streams live phase events and install output as Server-Sent Events, replaying the buffered event log then tailing until the deployment reaches a terminal status.

{
	"operation": "get_deployment",
	"deployment_id": "a3f8c2d1..."
}

The deployment record includes:

Field	Description
deployment_id	Unique identifier (content hash)
project	Component project name
package_identifier	Package reference or payload for tar uploads
status	pending, success, failed, or rolled_back
phase	Current lifecycle phase: prepare, load, replicate, restart
event_log	Bounded log of install output and phase transitions (up to 200 entries)
peer_results	Per-node outcome map for replicated deployments
payload_hash	SHA-256 hash of the deployment tarball
payload_size	Byte size of the deployment tarball
started_at	Timestamp when deployment began
completed_at	Timestamp when deployment finished
user	User who initiated the deployment
rollback_of	deployment_id of the deployment this rolls back, if applicable
error	Error message for failed deployments

get_deployment_payload

Returns the raw tarball for a deployment. Useful for inspecting or re-deploying a specific version.

{
	"operation": "get_deployment_payload",
	"deployment_id": "a3f8c2d1..."
}

The response is the raw tarball bytes (Content-Type: application/octet-stream, with a Content-Disposition download filename) - not JSON and not base64-encoded, so payloads of any size stream without inflation. Returns 404 if the deployment does not exist or its payload has already been reclaimed (by payload retention or delete_deployment_payload).

Unlike most other super_user operations, this check is enforced directly in the handler and cannot be satisfied by granting the operation through a role's operations allowlist - only an actual super_user role can call it.

delete_deployment_payload

Removes the tarball blob from a deployment record. The deployment record itself is retained; only the binary payload is deleted. Use this to reclaim storage after confirming a deployment is stable. The deletion replicates, so one call frees the payload's storage on every node in the cluster.

{
	"operation": "delete_deployment_payload",
	"deployment_id": "a3f8c2d1..."
}

Response:

{
	"message": "Deleted payload for deployment 'a3f8c2d1...'",
	"deployment_id": "a3f8c2d1...",
	"freed_bytes": 52428800
}

The deployment must be in a terminal status (success, failed, or rolled_back); deleting the payload of an in-progress deployment fails with 409, since its payload may still be replicating to peers. Deleting an already-reclaimed payload succeeds with freed_bytes: 0 (the operation is idempotent). A payload_dropped entry recording the deleting user is appended to the deployment's event_log.

add_ssh_key

Adds an SSH key (must be ed25519) for authenticating deployments from private repositories. Supply the private key with key, or omit it and pass generate: true to have Harper mint the keypair itself.

list_ssh_keys and the logs never return key material.

The stored private key is encrypted at rest and crosses the cluster as ciphertext when secret custody is configured. Custody is present by default — the file tier generates a cluster keypair on first boot — so this is the normal case.

warning

On a node with no secret custody registered, add_ssh_key stores and replicates the private key in plaintext. It logs a WARN saying so and the operation still succeeds, because SSH keys predate custody and must keep working on a node that has none.

That means encryption at rest is a property of your configuration, not a guarantee of the operation. If you are relying on it — and generate: true in particular reads as though the key can never be exposed — verify secretCustody is configured on every node in the cluster, and check the logs for that warning after adding a key. See Secrets.

Adding an existing key:

{
	"operation": "add_ssh_key",
	"name": "my-key",
	"key": "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n...\n-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n",
	"host": "my-key.github.com",
	"hostname": "github.com"
}

Server-side key generation (generate)

Added in: v5.2.4

With generate: true, Harper mints an ed25519 keypair on the node handling the request and returns only the public half. The private key is created inside the cluster and never travels from a client, so it can't be captured in a shell history, CI log, or request body on the way in:

{
	"operation": "add_ssh_key",
	"name": "my-key",
	"generate": true,
	"host": "my-key.github.com",
	"hostname": "github.com"
}

Response:

{
	"message": "Added ssh key: my-key",
	"public_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3Nza... harper:my-key"
}

Register that public_key with your git host (e.g. as a GitHub deploy key) to authorize the deploy. The generated key is commented harper:<name> so it's identifiable in the host's key list.

key and generate are mutually exclusive — sending both is rejected. Generation happens in-process, so it requires no ssh-keygen binary on the host and the minted private key is never written to a temporary file on its way into storage.

note

public_key is returned only on the generating call — that response is the one time the public half is handed back. Harper stores the private key (sealed, subject to the custody caveat above) and the host config; it does not retain the public key for later retrieval, and update_ssh_key requires a key you supply (it can't mint one). So capture public_key from this response — if you lose it, delete_ssh_key then add_ssh_key with generate: true again to mint a fresh pair, and re-register the new public key with your git host.

---

Secrets

Operations for managing the encrypted secrets store (system.hdb_secret). All secret operations are super_user only. Values are never returned or logged by any of these operations.

Detailed documentation: Secrets

tip

Prefer a UI? Harper Studio provides a graphical interface for creating, granting, and rotating secrets — it drives these operations for you, so you don't have to hand-craft the request bodies below.

Operation	Description	Role Required
set_secret	Creates or updates a secret and chooses its delivery tier	super_user
grant_secret	Adds a component to a scoped secret's grants (idempotent)	super_user
revoke_secret	Removes a component from a scoped secret's grants (idempotent)	super_user
list_secrets	Lists secret metadata — never envelopes or values	super_user
delete_secret	Deletes a secret row	super_user
get_secrets_public_key	Returns the cluster public key for client-side encryption	super_user

set_secret

Creates or updates a secret. Supply exactly one of value (plaintext, encrypted on ingest — requires custody on this node) or envelope (an enc:v1: ciphertext produced client-side against get_secrets_public_key). The delivery tier is processEnv: true or grants — the two are mutually exclusive. On update, tier and metadata default to the stored row, so a value rotation preserves the tier without re-specifying it.

Parameter	Type	Description
name	string	Secret name (word characters, dots, dashes). Required.
value	string	Plaintext value; encrypted immediately, then discarded. Requires custody.
envelope	string	enc:v1: ciphertext (alternative to value).
processEnv	boolean	true delivers the secret via process.env (global tier).
grants	string[]	Components allowed to read the secret via the secrets accessor (scoped tier).
metadata	object	Optional free-form label object (not a payload store).

{
	"operation": "set_secret",
	"name": "STRIPE_KEY",
	"value": "sk_live_...",
	"grants": ["payments-service"]
}

Response:

{ "name": "STRIPE_KEY", "kid": "<hex fingerprint>", "created": true }

grant_secret / revoke_secret

Add or remove a component from a scoped secret's grants list. Both are idempotent. A processEnv (global) secret cannot be granted — convert it with set_secret processEnv: false first.

{ "operation": "grant_secret", "name": "STRIPE_KEY", "component": "payments-service" }

Response includes the updated grants array and a changed flag (false when the call was a no-op).

list_secrets

Returns metadata for every secret — never envelopes or values. Each entry includes name, kid, grants, processEnv, metadata, unverified, updated_by, timestamps, and kid_matches_custody (so a stale row on a cloned/rekeyed node is immediately visible). The response also carries the node's custody_fingerprint (null when no custody is held).

{ "operation": "list_secrets" }

Response:

{
	"secrets": [
		{
			"name": "STRIPE_KEY",
			"kid": "a1b2c3d4...",
			"grants": ["payments-service"],
			"processEnv": false,
			"metadata": {},
			"unverified": false,
			"updated_by": "admin",
			"__createdtime__": 1700000000000,
			"__updatedtime__": 1700000000000,
			"kid_matches_custody": true
		}
	],
	"custody_fingerprint": "a1b2c3d4..."
}

delete_secret

Removes a secret row by name. Not cryptographic erasure — audit/transaction logs and backups retain the encrypted envelope.

{ "operation": "delete_secret", "name": "STRIPE_KEY" }

get_secrets_public_key

Returns the cluster secrets public key for client-side envelope encryption. Requires custody on the node.

{ "operation": "get_secrets_public_key" }

Response:

{ "public_key": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n...", "fingerprint": "<hex sha256>" }

---

Replication & Clustering

Operations for configuring and managing Harper cluster replication.

Detailed documentation: Replication & Clustering

Operation	Description	Role Required
add_node	Adds a Harper instance to the cluster	super_user
update_node	Modifies an existing node's subscriptions	super_user
remove_node	Removes a node from the cluster	super_user
cluster_status	Returns current cluster connection status	super_user
configure_cluster	Bulk-creates/resets cluster subscriptions across multiple nodes	super_user
cluster_set_routes	Adds routes to the replication routes config (PATCH/upsert)	super_user
cluster_get_routes	Returns the current replication routes config	super_user
cluster_delete_routes	Removes routes from the replication routes config	super_user

add_node

Adds a remote Harper node to the cluster. If subscriptions are not provided, a fully replicating cluster is created. Optional fields: verify_tls, authorization, retain_authorization, revoked_certificates, shard.

{
	"operation": "add_node",
	"hostname": "server-two",
	"verify_tls": false,
	"authorization": { "username": "admin", "password": "password" }
}

cluster_status

Returns connection state for all cluster nodes, including per-database socket status and replication timing statistics (lastCommitConfirmed, lastReceivedRemoteTime, lastReceivedLocalTime).

{ "operation": "cluster_status" }

configure_cluster

Resets and replaces the entire clustering configuration. Each entry follows the add_node schema.

{
	"operation": "configure_cluster",
	"connections": [
		{
			"hostname": "server-two",
			"subscriptions": [{ "database": "dev", "table": "dog", "subscribe": true, "publish": true }]
		}
	]
}

---

Configuration

Operations for reading and updating Harper configuration.

Detailed documentation: Configuration Overview

Operation	Description	Role Required
set_configuration	Modifies Harper configuration file parameters (requires restart)	super_user
get_configuration	Returns the current Harper configuration	super_user

set_configuration

Updates configuration parameters in harper-config.yaml. A restart (restart or restart_service) is required for changes to take effect.

Supports "replicated": true Added in: v5.2.0 to apply the same change to all cluster nodes in one call; per-node outcomes are returned in the response's replicated array. Only send cluster-appropriate parameters when replicating — node-local parameters (ports, node.hostname, file paths, TLS material, replication.hostname/url/routes) would overwrite every peer's local values. To apply the change cluster-wide, follow with restart_service using "replicated": true (which restarts nodes one at a time). See Configuration Operations for details.

{
	"operation": "set_configuration",
	"logging_level": "trace",
	"replicated": true
}

get_configuration

Returns the full current configuration object.

{ "operation": "get_configuration" }

---

Web Application Firewall

Added in: v5.2.0

Operations for managing Web Application Firewall rules and cluster-wide enforcement controls.

Detailed documentation: WAF Operations and Rule Schema

Operation	Description	Role Required
add_waf_rule	Creates a validated WAF rule	super_user
alter_waf_rule	Patches and revalidates an existing WAF rule	super_user
drop_waf_rule	Deletes a WAF rule	super_user
list_waf_rules	Returns all WAF rules	super_user
set_waf_mode	Sets the replicated mode and/or scoring threshold	super_user

---

System

Operations for restarting Harper and managing system state.

Operation	Description	Role Required
restart	Restarts the Harper instance	super_user
restart_service	Restarts a specific Harper service	super_user
system_information	Returns detailed host system metrics	super_user
set_status	Sets an application-specific status value (in-memory)	super_user
get_status	Returns a previously set status value	super_user
clear_status	Removes a status entry	super_user

restart

Restarts all Harper processes. May take up to 60 seconds.

{ "operation": "restart" }

restart_service

Restarts a specific service. service must be one of: http, http_workers, custom_functions, harperdb (all currently restart the HTTP workers). Supports "replicated": true for a rolling cluster restart.

{ "operation": "restart_service", "service": "http_workers" }

system_information

Returns system metrics including CPU, memory, disk, network, and Harper process info. Optionally filter by attributes array (e.g., ["cpu", "memory", "replication"]).

{ "operation": "system_information" }

set_status / get_status / clear_status

Manage in-memory application status values. Status types: primary, maintenance, availability (availability only accepts 'Available' or 'Unavailable'). Status is not persisted across restarts.

{ "operation": "set_status", "id": "primary", "status": "active" }

---

Agent

Added in: v5.2.0

Operations for driving Harper's built-in agent — an LLM loop that operates the instance through Harper's own operations, scoped filesystem access, followup scheduling, the V8 inspector, and outbound HTTP. The loop runs on the main thread, so an active run competes with Harper's other main-thread work; prefer running exploratory prompts against a node that is not serving production traffic.

The agent component is disabled by default. Enable it with agent.enabled: true in harper-config.yaml (see agent) and configure a generative model under models. With the component disabled at startup none of these operations are registered, so calling one is an unknown-operation error rather than a permission or state error.

All six operations are super_user by default. They participate in the role operations allowlist, so a non-super_user role can be granted a scoped subset without granting full super_user — either individual names (operations: ['agent_prompt', 'get_agent_session']) or the built-in agent permission group, which covers all of these except set_agent_config. Note that the read operations are not caller-scoped: a role granted get_agent_session or list_agent_sessions reads every session on the instance, including transcripts of runs it did not start. Because a transcript records the arguments and output of every tool call, and those calls ran as agent.user, delegating a read operation hands that role the results of work done at the agent's privilege — table contents, log excerpts, configuration — regardless of its own permissions. Delegate the read operations only to roles you would trust with the agent itself.

warning

Anyone who can call agent_prompt can direct whatever the agent does. Understand the boundary before enabling it:

• agent.user (default: a super_user bootstrap identity) governs only the operations tools. Setting it to a restricted user narrows those, and nothing else.
• The agent's other tools — scoped filesystem access, outbound http_fetch, followup scheduling, and the V8 inspector — run at the Harper process's own privilege, whatever agent.user is. (The inspector tools additionally need threads.debug, and fail with an explanatory error without it.)
• http_fetch blocks only the known cloud-metadata hostnames and the IPv4 link-local range 169.254.0.0/16, and it checks the literal hostname you pass — a name that resolves to a blocked address is not caught, and redirects are followed without re-checking. Every other host, including anything private or internal the server can route to, is reachable. Reading is ungated too: read_file covers the log and configuration directories as well as the component tree, so an enabled agent puts a read path and an egress path in the same toolset. Treat it as an outbound network client and apply egress policy to the host.
• With the default agent.allowDestructive: false, destructive tools (including filesystem writes) are removed from the toolset entirely. Turning it on admits component writes, and component code is executed by the Harper process — a write is effectively code execution at process privilege.
• Leave agent.autoApprove off so any destructive call that is admitted still pauses for approval. The gate covers only the tools marked destructive — filesystem writes, the inspector's code-evaluation tools, and the operations on MCP's curated destructive set (drop_table, delete, restart, set_configuration, ...). http_fetch and followup scheduling are not gated, so an outbound POST and a self-rescheduling run proceed without an approval prompt.
• That set is an explicit list in core rather than a prefix match, and it is not a list of every damaging operation, so allowDestructive and autoApprove are not a boundary by themselves. The component operations are the ones to know about: drop_component and deploy_component are both off the set, so opting either into mcp.operations.allow puts it in the agent's toolset where allowDestructive: false does not remove it and no approval gates it — and deploy_component writes code the Harper process then executes. Vet anything you add to that allow list on its own merits rather than assuming these two settings cover it.

Operation	Description	Role Required
agent_prompt	Starts or continues an agent session and kicks off a run	super_user
get_agent_session	Returns a session: status, full transcript, pending approvals	super_user
list_agent_sessions	Lists agent sessions	super_user
approve_agent_action	Approves or denies a gated tool call and resumes the run	super_user
cancel_agent_run	Cancels a run and marks the session aborted	super_user
set_agent_config	Updates agent settings in memory for the life of the process	super_user

Sessions and run status

Each conversation is a session, persisted to system.hdb_agent_session so transcripts survive a restart. Runs are asynchronous: agent_prompt returns as soon as the run is started, and you poll get_agent_session for progress and results.

Transcripts are retained indefinitely — the table is audited and none of these operations delete a session — and each tool call is recorded with its arguments as well as its output, so a bearer token in an http_fetch header or a secret in a set_configuration call is stored verbatim. Treat a prompt and everything a run passes to a tool as durably recorded, and keep credentials out of both.

The table also carries no replication opt-out: it is not on core's list of non-replicating system tables, so on a cluster that replicates the system database, expect transcripts to reach peer nodes with it, and a backup of system to carry them as well. Treat a run's prompts and tool output as cluster-wide rather than local to the node that served the request.

A run does not resume across a restart, and nothing reconciles session status at startup: a session the restart caught in running or awaiting_approval keeps that status indefinitely, so polling never terminates and agent_prompt rejects it with a 409. Clear it with cancel_agent_run, which reports "signalledLiveRun": false because there is no live run left to signal.

A session's status is one of:

Status	Meaning
idle	Created, or resumable — no run in flight
running	A run is in progress
awaiting_approval	Paused on one or more destructive tool calls; see pendingApprovals
completed	The run ended without throwing — a final answer, or the maxTurns ceiling; check lastError
aborted	Cancelled by an operator via cancel_agent_run
error	The run failed; lastError carries the message

completed also covers hitting the agent.maxTurns ceiling — in that case lastError reads Reached maxTurns=<n> without a final answer., so check it before treating a completed session as finished.

agent_prompt

Sends a prompt to the agent. Omit session_id to start a new session; supply one to continue an existing conversation. Returns immediately with the session id and "status": "running".

Parameter	Type	Description
message	string	The instruction for the agent. Required, must be non-empty.
session_id	string	Existing session to continue. Omit to create a new session.

{
	"operation": "agent_prompt",
	"message": "Create a component called inventory with a Product table keyed by sku, then verify it responds over REST."
}

Response:

{ "session_id": "3f7c...", "status": "running" }

A session that is running or awaiting_approval rejects a new prompt with a 409 — resolve the pending approval or cancel the run first.

get_agent_session

Returns the full session record: status, user (the Operations API caller who created the session, falling back to agent.user), the messages transcript (user, assistant, and tool messages, including tool calls and their observations), pendingApprovals, model, provider, createdAt/updatedAt, and lastError. This is the polling endpoint for a run in flight.

{ "operation": "get_agent_session", "session_id": "3f7c..." }

Unknown session_id returns a 404.

list_agent_sessions

Lists agent sessions.

Parameter	Type	Description
limit	integer	Maximum sessions to return. Default 100.

{ "operation": "list_agent_sessions", "limit": 20 }

Response:

{ "sessions": [{ "session_id": "3f7c...", "status": "completed", "...": "..." }] }

Through v5.2.4 the result order is not chronological — session ids are UUIDs and the listing walks them in reverse key order — and limit is applied by that scan, so once there are more sessions than limit the ones left out are an arbitrary subset rather than the oldest. On those versions, request a limit above your session count and sort on updatedAt or createdAt yourself if you need recency. The ordering is fixed in core by harper#2268 — check the release notes for the version it ships in.

approve_agent_action

When agent.autoApprove is off (the default), any tool call the agent makes to a destructive operation pauses the run and lands in the session's pendingApprovals. This operation resolves one of them and resumes the run. Each entry carries its identifier in an id field — pass that as approval_id — alongside toolName, arguments, and reason.

Parameter	Type	Description
session_id	string	Required.
approval_id	string	The id of the entry in get_agent_session's pendingApprovals. Required.
approved	boolean	true to approve (default). false denies the call.

{
	"operation": "approve_agent_action",
	"session_id": "3f7c...",
	"approval_id": "9b21...",
	"approved": true
}

Both decisions resume the loop: an approval executes the saved tool call, and a denial hands the refusal back to the model as an observation so it can adjust. Neither ends the run — use cancel_agent_run for that. If a single turn produced several gated calls, the session stays awaiting_approval until every one of them is resolved. Resolving an already-resolved approval is an error.

Whether a tool is treated as destructive at all is governed by agent.allowDestructive: when it is false (the default), destructive tools are removed from the agent's toolset entirely rather than gated. Which tools carry that mark is fixed in core — write_file, the inspector's code-evaluation tools, and the operations on MCP's curated destructive set — so an operation outside it (drop_component and deploy_component among them) is neither removed nor gated.

cancel_agent_run

Cancels a session's run, clears any followups it scheduled, and marks the session aborted. Works on a paused (awaiting_approval) or idle session as well as an actively running one.

{ "operation": "cancel_agent_run", "session_id": "3f7c..." }

Response:

{ "cancelled": true, "signalledLiveRun": true }

cancelled is false if the session had already reached a terminal state (completed, aborted, error). signalledLiveRun reports whether there was an in-flight run to abort — a paused session yields false while still being marked aborted.

One gap is worth knowing: changing allowDestructive with set_agent_config rebuilds the toolset, and followups scheduled before that change are no longer tracked, so a later cancel does not clear them. A stray followup starts a fresh run even after a cancel and even with enabled set to false. If a run has scheduled followups, avoid toggling allowDestructive mid-session, and restart the node if one escapes.

set_agent_config

Updates agent settings and returns the resulting configuration. Accepts any of enabled, provider, model, maxTurns, maxCostUsd, autoApprove, allowDestructive, and systemPromptAppend; keys not supplied are left unchanged. Each field is described under agent.

{ "operation": "set_agent_config", "autoApprove": false, "maxTurns": 20 }

Three limits are worth knowing:

• The change is in-memory and not persisted. It applies for the life of the process and is lost on restart; edit harper-config.yaml for a durable change.
• A run already in flight keeps the settings it started with — its toolset, autoApprove, model, and systemPromptAppend are all captured at start. Changes take effect on the next run. To stop a run immediately, use cancel_agent_run.
• enabled is not a kill switch. It cannot turn the agent on — if it was off at startup, this operation does not exist. Setting it to false only makes subsequent agent_prompt calls return 409; a run already in flight continues, and approve_agent_action still resumes a paused one. Use cancel_agent_run to stop a run.

MCP access

When the MCP server is enabled with the operations profile, agent_prompt, get_agent_session, list_agent_sessions, approve_agent_action, and cancel_agent_run are also exposed as MCP tools, with no allow-list entry required. They dispatch through the same authorization path as the operations above, and are listed only for users whose role could call them. set_agent_config is deliberately not exposed over MCP — it is an operator action.

---

Backup & Restore

Operations for backing up and restoring databases. Managed backups Added in: v5.2.0 require the RocksDB storage engine; get_backup works with both RocksDB and LMDB.

Detailed documentation: Backup Operations

Operation	Description	Role Required
create_backup	Creates a managed, incremental directory backup of a database (job)	super_user
list_backups	Lists the managed backups for a database	super_user
verify_backup	Verifies a managed backup's integrity (job)	super_user
delete_backup	Deletes a single managed backup	super_user
purge_backups	Deletes all but the newest keep_count managed backups	super_user
restore_backup	Restores a database from a managed backup (job)	super_user
get_backup	Streams a full snapshot of a database in the response for download	super_user

create_backup

Creates an incremental directory backup of the database under the configured backup root. Runs as a background job that reports the new backup_id.

{ "operation": "create_backup", "database": "dev" }

list_backups

Returns the managed backups for a database, each with its backup_id, timestamp, size, and file_count.

{ "operation": "list_backups", "database": "dev" }

verify_backup

Verifies a managed backup's integrity, including checksums when verify_checksum is true (slower). Runs as a background job.

{ "operation": "verify_backup", "database": "dev", "backup_id": 1, "verify_checksum": true }

delete_backup

Deletes a single managed backup.

{ "operation": "delete_backup", "database": "dev", "backup_id": 1 }

purge_backups

Deletes all but the newest keep_count managed backups.

{ "operation": "purge_backups", "database": "dev", "keep_count": 3 }

restore_backup

Restores a database in place from a managed backup, as a background job. backup_id defaults to the latest backup. Restoring the system database, or a database a loaded component keeps open, requires the server to be stopped — see when can a database be restored?

{ "operation": "restore_backup", "database": "dev", "backup_id": 1 }

get_backup

Streams a full snapshot of the specified database in the HTTP response for download. For RocksDB Changed in: v5.2.0, a tar archive of the current state (including file-backed blobs unless exclude_blobs is set), gzipped by default; for LMDB, the .mdb file.

{ "operation": "get_backup", "database": "dev" }

---

Jobs

Operations for querying background job status.

Detailed documentation: Database Jobs

Operation	Description	Role Required
get_job	Returns status and results for a specific job ID	any
search_jobs_by_start_date	Returns jobs within a specified time window	super_user

get_job

Returns job status (COMPLETE, IN_PROGRESS, ERROR), timing, and result message for the specified job ID. Bulk import/export operations return a job ID on initiation.

{ "operation": "get_job", "id": "4a982782-929a-4507-8794-26dae1132def" }

search_jobs_by_start_date

Returns all jobs started within the specified datetime range.

{
	"operation": "search_jobs_by_start_date",
	"from_date": "2021-01-25T22:05:27.464+0000",
	"to_date": "2021-01-25T23:05:27.464+0000"
}

---

Logs

Operations for reading Harper logs.

Detailed documentation: Logging Operations

Operation	Description	Role Required
read_log	Returns entries from the primary hdb.log	super_user
read_transaction_log	Returns transaction history for a table	super_user
delete_transaction_logs_before	Deletes transaction log entries older than a timestamp	super_user
read_audit_log	Returns verbose transaction history for a table, including original record values (requires transaction logging enabled)	super_user
delete_audit_logs_before	Deletes transaction log entries older than a timestamp (deprecated alias of delete_transaction_logs_before)	super_user

read_log

Returns entries from hdb.log. Filter by level (notify, error, warn, info, debug, trace), date range (from, until), and text filter.

{
	"operation": "read_log",
	"start": 0,
	"limit": 100,
	"level": "error"
}

read_transaction_log

Returns transaction history for a specific table. Optionally filter by from/to (millisecond epoch) and limit.

{
	"operation": "read_transaction_log",
	"schema": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"limit": 10
}

read_audit_log

Returns verbose transaction history including original record state. Requires transaction logging (logging.auditLog: true) in configuration. Filter by search_type: hash_value, timestamp, or username.

{
	"operation": "read_audit_log",
	"schema": "dev",
	"table": "dog",
	"search_type": "username",
	"search_values": ["admin"]
}

---

Certificate Management

Operations for managing TLS certificates in the hdb_certificate system table.

Detailed documentation: Certificate Management

Operation	Description	Role Required
add_certificate	Adds or updates a certificate	super_user
remove_certificate	Removes a certificate and its private key file	super_user
list_certificates	Lists all certificates	super_user

add_certificate

Adds a certificate to hdb_certificate. If a private_key is provided, it is written to <rootPath>/keys/ (not stored in the table). If no private key is provided, the operation searches for a matching one on disk.

{
	"operation": "add_certificate",
	"name": "my-cert",
	"certificate": "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----...",
	"is_authority": false,
	"private_key": "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----..."
}

---

Analytics

Operations for querying analytics metrics.

Detailed documentation: Analytics Operations

Operation	Description	Role Required
get_analytics	Retrieves analytics data for a specified metric	any
list_metrics	Lists available analytics metrics	any
describe_metric	Returns the schema of a specific metric	any

get_analytics

Retrieves analytics data. Supports start_time/end_time (Unix ms), get_attributes, and conditions (same format as search_by_conditions).

{
	"operation": "get_analytics",
	"metric": "resource-usage",
	"start_time": 1769198332754,
	"end_time": 1769198532754
}

list_metrics

Returns available metric names. Filter by metric_types: custom, builtin (default: builtin).

{ "operation": "list_metrics" }

---

Registration & Licensing

Operations for license management.

Operation	Description	Role Required
registration_info	Returns registration and version information	any
install_usage_license	Installs a Harper usage license block	super_user
get_usage_licenses	Returns all usage licenses with consumption counts	super_user
get_fingerprint	(Deprecated) Returns the machine fingerprint	super_user
set_license	(Deprecated) Sets a license key	super_user

registration_info

Returns the instance registration status, version, RAM allocation, and license expiration.

{ "operation": "registration_info" }

install_usage_license

Installs a usage license block. A license is a JWT-like structure (header.payload.signature) signed by Harper. Multiple blocks may be installed; earliest blocks are consumed first.

{
	"operation": "install_usage_license",
	"license": "abc...0123.abc...0123.abc...0123"
}

get_usage_licenses

Returns all usage licenses (including expired/exhausted) with current consumption counts. Optionally filter by region.

{ "operation": "get_usage_licenses" }

---

Deprecated Operations

The following operations are deprecated and should not be used in new code.

Custom Functions (Deprecated)

Custom Functions were the precursor to the Component architecture introduced in v4.2.0. These operations are preserved for backward compatibility.

Deprecated in: v4.2.0 (moved to legacy in v4.7+)

For modern equivalents, see Components Overview.

Operation	Description
custom_functions_status	Returns Custom Functions server status
get_custom_functions	Lists all Custom Function projects
get_custom_function	Returns a Custom Function file's content
set_custom_function	Creates or updates a Custom Function file
drop_custom_function	Deletes a Custom Function file
add_custom_function_project	Creates a new Custom Function project
drop_custom_function_project	Deletes a Custom Function project
package_custom_function_project	Packages a Custom Function project as base64 tar
deploy_custom_function_project	Deploys a packaged Custom Function project

Other Deprecated Operations

Operation	Replaced By
install_node_modules	Handled automatically by deploy_component and restart
get_fingerprint	Use registration_info
set_license	Use install_usage_license
search_by_hash	Use search_by_id
search_attribute	Use attribute field in search_by_value / search_by_conditions
search_value	Use value field in search_by_value / search_by_conditions
search_type	Use comparator field in search_by_conditions